On 1 April 2022, the Human Rights Council (HRC) concluded the longest session it had held since being established in 2006.¹ The session took place against an exceptional backdrop of events that placed the HRC at the heart of multilateral diplomacy, at a time when other intergovernmental bodies were in stalemate. In response to rapidly evolving developments following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the HRC – taking upon itself a mandate for accountability – called for immediate de-escalation and respect for international humanitarian law.

The urgent debate of 3–4 March 2022 at the 49th session of the HRC led to the formation of an independent international commission of inquiry mandated with investigating alleged human rights violations and abuses, violations of international humanitarian law, and related crimes in the context of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine (with 32 votes in favour of the resolution, 2 against and 13 abstentions).² Streamed live on the HRC’s Twitter account, the debate pulled in 3.7 million viewers, with its ensuing resolution re-tweeted over 4,500 times. The resolution was unique in being the first ever to call for an investigation of a permanent member of the Security Council (ie Russia).

Centrality of protection and the Human Rights Council

Since 2014, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) has presented close to 50 reports, along with oral updates, to the HRC, providing detailed analysis of alleged abuses and violations of international law in Ukraine. These reports have issued recommendations to all duty-bearers and the international community with a view to preventing human rights violations and mitigating emerging risks.

While Ukraine offers a clear case in point, it is far from the only context where potentially preventive measures anchored in rights have been insufficient to prevent deterioration. The 49th session of the HRC also saw the establishment of a group of experts on Nicaragua mandated with investigating human rights violations and abuses committed since 2018. Moreover, the HRC renewed commissions of inquiry in South Sudan, Syria and Belarus, in addition to extending the mandates of Special Rapporteurs and Independent Experts on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Myanmar, Iran, Occupied Palestinian territories and Mali – contexts that have been under scrutiny by the HRC and the General Assembly for years.³ Often used as a house of last resort, the HRC early-warning function remains under-utilised by Member States looking to prevent violations.

Polarisation of the human rights agenda and its impacts on the UN regular budget

At this time of global crisis, when the UN human rights system is needed most, entrenched polarisation coupled with resource constraints have profoundly impacted implementation of the UN’s normative agenda. The third pillar of the UN remains severely underfunded, with only US$ 136.7 million – or slightly over 4% of the overall UN regular budget (excluding humanitarian affairs) – allocated to human rights in 2022. Cross-regional initiatives to strengthen this pillar since 2012 have not yet translated into a global commitment. Aside from some additional resources allocated in recent years to strengthening treaty bodies and to new mandates established by the HRC, funding for the pillar has seen zero growth.

Despite the level of activity in the HRC testifying to the robustness of the international human rights system, securing regular budget funding for mandated activities has become an uphill battle. The HRC’s 49 session attracted the participation of over 180 dignitaries, with the 35 resolutions adopted requiring an estimated additional funding of over US$ 25 million. Stark divisions, however, have continued to fuel heated discussions at the General Assembly’s Fifth Committee.⁴ Even so, the HRC continues to issue mandates with a focus on criminal accountability in order to support prosecutorial and judicial processes that require specialised skills and expertise.

The proliferation of mandates has led to the budget allocation process becoming more complex and uncertain, with increasing demands that OHCHR absorb new capacity requirements. In an unprecedented move, Ethiopia tabled a resolution proposing that no funds at all be given to the International Commission of Human Rights Experts on Ethiopia, in contradiction of the intergovernmental HRC resolution establishing it. The move was rejected.

Moreover, arguments that attempt to politicise the human rights agenda (undermining their universality) continue to polarise states’ positions, despite a lack of any defined fault-line that cuts across issues, whether thematic or geographic. Ad hoc alliances formed around resolutions shift even in situations that present similarities. This uncertainty is reflected in voting patterns, in particular for mandates where the voting margin is very narrow.

Implications of an over-reliance on voluntary contributions

In response to this uncertainty and polarisation, and the budget shortfalls that have arisen as a consequence, OHCHR has come to rely increasingly on voluntary contributions, which now fund more than 63% of its activities. The organisation has benefited from an increase in donor funding in recent years, which reached a record high of US$ 227.7 million in 2021.

Increasing reliance on voluntary contributions from a limited number of Member States to fund the UN normative agenda is problematic. Voluntary funding can be unpredictable, creating financial insecurity and reducing both flexibility and sustainability. In 2021, only 24 of the 89 donors provided voluntary contributions of US$ 1 million or above, pointing to an ongoing funding diversification challenge. Earmarking – contained in 63% of the voluntary contributions OHCHR received in 2021 – leads to higher transactional costs, depriving OHCHR of the flexibility it requires to respond to identified human rights priorities and increasing the perception that its work lacks independence.

In addition, rapid movements of funds have followed the abrupt shifts of attention the international community has displayed towards issues of immediate national interest. OHCHR’s ability to adapt to the COVID-19 crisis meant that it received its highest ever levels of contributions in 2020 and 2021: US$ 224.3 and US$ 227.7 million respectively. Subsequently, donor interest shifted to the crisis in Tigray in 2021. OHCHR received more funds than it expected for its immediate work on Tigray and over US$ 10 million in one month for Ukraine.

By contrast, however, OHCHR has failed to obtain the US$ 7.2 million required to maintain its monitoring presence in Yemen, one of the world’s largest humanitarian crises.⁵ In another concerning development, some of OHCHR’s major donors have indicated the Ukraine crisis will impact their ability to maintain current funding levels for 2022. If this indeed comes to pass, it will have a significant detrimental effect on the UN's ability to fulfil its human rights mandate and for the overall progress in realising the Sustainable Developments Goals (SDGs).